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 An HIV-positive individual who fails to disclose 
his or her status to a sexual partner may face charges 
ranging from nuisance to murder for such behaviour, 
with the most common charges being aggravated 
assault and aggravated sexual assault. The number of 
prosecutions in Canada against individuals who fail to 
disclose their HIV-positive status to their sexual 
partners has risen over the last ten years. At the same 
time, scientific advancements in treatment options and 
our understanding of transmission, condom usage, and 
viral load are constantly influencing the assessment of 
the risk that nondisclosure poses to the complainant in 
any given case. 
 The author reviews the recent case of R. v. 
Mabior, the first judgment in Canada to criminalize 
nondisclosure in the context of protected sex. She 
argues that encouraging condom use is so important, 
and that the use of condoms reduces the risk of 
transmission so significantly, that the criminal law 
should distinguish between protected and unprotected 
sex in cases of nondisclosure. The author proceeds to 
critique the trial judge's reliance on viral load as a factor 
in determining whether nondisclosure poses a 
significant risk of serious bodily harm under the test 
established in Cuerrier. The author argues that the 
accused's viral load, unlike condom use, is not a 
manageable standard on which to base culpability.   
Un individu séropositif qui omet de divulguer son 
état à son partenaire sexuel s’expose à des poursuites 
criminelles allant de la nuisance au meurtre. Les 
poursuites les plus communes sanctionnant un tel 
comportement sont celles de voies de fait graves et 
l’agression sexuelle grave. Le nombre de poursuites 
contre des individus ayant omis de divulguer leur 
séropositivité à leur partenaire est en hausse au Canada 
depuis les dix dernières années. En même temps, les 
avancées scientifiques au niveau des options de 
traitement, de même que la meilleure compréhension de 
la transmission, de l’usage du condom et de la charge 
virale dans le sang, influencent sans cesse et de manière 
diverse l’évaluation du risque que pose la non-
divulgation pour le plaignant. 
 L’auteure examine la décision récente R. c. 
Mabior, qui constitue le premier jugement au Canada à 
criminaliser la non-divulgation dans le cadre d’une 
relation sexuelle protégée. Elle affirme qu’encourager 
l’usage du condom, lequel réduit de manière 
significative le risque de transmission, est si important 
que le droit pénal devrait établir une distinction entre 
les cas de non-divulgation lors de relations sexuelles 
protégées et lors de relations sexuelles non protégées. 
L’auteure critique la prise en compte par le juge de 
première instance du la charge virale dans le sang en 
tant que facteur permettant de déterminer si la non-
divulgation pose un risque significatif de blessures 
graves au sens du test établi dans l’affaire Cuerrier. 
L’auteure croit que le la charge virale de l’accusé, 
contrairement à l’usage du condom, n’est pas un critère 
sur lequel il est possible en pratique de faire reposer la 
culpabilité. 
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Introduction
 Over the past ten years in Canada, we have seen an increase in prosecutions 
against (mostly) men who fail to disclose their HIV-positive status to their sexual 
partners.1 The Crown has relied on charges ranging in severity from nuisance2 
through to murder.3 Most notably, in 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada held in R. v. 
Cuerrier that the failure to disclose one’s HIV-positive status, where this creates a 
significant risk of serious bodily harm to the complainant, constitutes fraud and 
thereby negates consent to sexual activity. When this is combined with the risk of 
transmitting HIV, the crimes of aggravated assault and aggravated sexual assault are 
made out.4 The Court complicated this finding in R. v. Williams, where it held that, in 
order to establish aggravated assault or aggravated sexual assault, the Crown would 
have to prove that the complainant was HIV-negative at the time the accused failed to 
disclose his or her status. If this cannot be proven, then the proper verdict is attempted 
aggravated (sexual) assault.5 
 Many articles have been written on the pros and cons of the criminalization of 
nondisclosure,6 and this case comment does not revisit that debate. Rather, it assumes 
that criminalization is here to stay, at least for the immediate future. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has considered this issue and upheld criminalization on three 
 
1 See Isabel Grant, “The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: The Criminalization of the Non-
disclosure of HIV” (2008) 31 Dal. L.J. 123.  
2 R. v. Summer, [1989] 98 A.R 191, 8 W.C.B. (2d) 178 (Prov. Ct.), aff’d 69 Alta. L.R. (2d) 303, 73 
C.R. (3d) 32 (C.A.). 
3 A jury convicted Johnson Aziga of two counts of first-degree murder in April, 2009, making him 
the first person in the world to be convicted of murder for spreading HIV. See Barbara Brown, “Life 
Term for Aziga: Murder Verdicts in HIV Transmission Case Make History” The Hamilton Spectator 
(6 April 2009), online: The Spec.com <http://www.thespec.com/article/543731>. 
4 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 162 D.L.R. (4th) 513 [Cuerrier cited to S.C.R.]. 
5 2003 SCC 41, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134, 231 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1 [Williams]. 
6 See e.g. Scott Burris et al. “Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical Trial” 
(2007) 39 Ariz. St. L.J. 467 [Burris et al., “Criminal Laws and Behavior”]; Samantha Ryan, “Reckless 
Transmission of HIV: Knowledge and Culpability” [2006] Crim. L. Rev. 981; Richard Elliott, 
“Criminal Law, Public Health and HIV Transmission: A Policy Options Paper” (2002) at 24, online: 
UNAIDS <http://data.unaids.org/Publications/IRC-pub02/JC733-CriminalLaw_en.pdf>; Harlon L. 
Dalton, “Criminal Law” in Scott Burris et al., eds., AIDS Law Today: A New Guide for the Public, 2d 
ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) 242; David P. Niemeier, “The Criminal Transmission of 
AIDS: A Critical Examination of Missouri’s HIV-Specific Statute” (2001) 45 Saint Louis U.L.J. 667 at 
671-73; Amy L. McGuire, “AIDS as a Weapon: Criminal Prosecution of HIV Exposure” (1999) 36 
Hous. L. Rev. 1787 at 1791-94; Jaclyn Schmitt Hermes “The Criminal Transmission of HIV: A 
Proposal to Eliminate Iowa’s Statute” (2002) 6 J. Gender Race & Just. 473 at 475-8; Jody B. Gabel 
“Liability for ‘Knowing’ Transmission of HIV: The Evolution of a Duty to Disclose” (1994) 21 Fla. 
St. U.L. Rev. 981 at 983-7. 
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occasions without a single dissenting voice.7 This comment focuses on how best to 
limit and define the contours of criminalization, looking specifically at the relevance 
of condom use and viral load.  
 R. v. Mabior8 is but one of many cases dealing with serious criminal charges 
against an accused for failing to disclose his or her HIV status. While Mabior is only 
a trial decision, there are two difficult and important aspects of the decision that merit 
attention. First, Mabior is the only case in Canada to criminalize nondisclosure in the 
context of protected sex.9 Second, Mabior is the only case to hold that, in the context 
of protected sex, a very low or undetectable viral load can sufficiently reduce the risk 
of serious bodily harm to preclude a finding of fraud negating consent. This comment 
will focus on these two issues and highlight the complexity of nondisclosure 
prosecutions. I argue that encouraging condom use is so important, and that the use of 
condoms reduces the risk of transmission so significantly, that the criminal law 
should distinguish between protected and unprotected sex in cases of nondisclosure. 
In contrast, however, I argue that viral load is not yet a manageable standard on which 
to base culpability. 
I. The Facts in Mabior 
 The accused in Mabior was charged with ten counts of aggravated sexual assault 
and one count each of forcible confinement, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual 
interference. Only the aggravated sexual assault charges are the subject of this 
comment.10 The evidence indicated that the accused sought out teenage runaways 
from vulnerable backgrounds, one as young as twelve years old at the time of the 
offence, by offering them drugs, alcohol and a place to stay. As of the date of trial, 
none of the complainants had tested positive for HIV.11 
 
7 R. v. Thornton, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 445, 13 O.R. (3d) 744; Cuerrier, supra note 4; Williams, supra 
note 5. The Court considered this issue a fourth time when it denied leave to appeal after the 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal had raised a sentence for criminal negligence from twenty-seven 
months to over eleven years: R. v. Mercer (1993), 110 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 41, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 41 (Nfld. 
C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1994] 1 S.C.R. ix, 120 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 90 n. 
8 2008 MBQB 201, 230 Man. R. (2d) 184, 78 W.C.B. (2d) 380, motion to appeal filed (7 November 
2008), Winnipeg AR08-30-07036 (Man. C.A.) [Mabior]. As of 18 August 2009, the appeal was 
tentatively set to proceed on 1 December 2009: Telephone interview of Manitoba Court of Appeal 
Registry Clerk (18 August 2009).  
9 See Grant, supra note 1. 
10 Mabior was convicted on six counts of aggravated sexual assault and one count each of invitation 
to sexual touching and sexual interference (supra note 8 at paras. 164-67). He was sentenced to 
seventeen years in prison, which was reduced to fourteen years on the basis of the principle of totality 
and further reduced to nine years based on time served. The Crown asked for a sentence of twenty-
four years (Sentencing (10 October 2008), Winnipeg CR 07-01-27848 (Man. Q.B.), McKelvey J.). 
11 Mabior, ibid. at para. 5.  
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 Mabior learned that he was HIV-positive in January of 2004. After receiving this 
information, he had extensive involvement with the public health system. Public 
health officials provided him with information regarding HIV and told him to practise 
safer sex and to disclose his HIV status to his sexual partners. Mabior was also 
warned of the potential criminal liability that could attach to nondisclosure. He 
received condoms from the health unit on a regular basis. However, he was diagnosed 
with gonorrhea and was a named as a contact person for chlamydia, facts which were 
used at trial to cast doubt on the assertion that he used condoms appropriately in 
sexual activity.12  
 Between 1 January 2004 and 31 March 2006, the accused had sexual intercourse 
with the nine complainants, sometimes with the use of a condom and sometimes 
without. In no case did he disclose his HIV status prior to sexual intercourse. He was, 
with one exception, compliant with his antiretroviral medication regime which 
brought his viral load down to an undetectable level from October 2004 to December 
2005. However, neither public health officials nor his doctor ever suggested to 
Mabior that an undetectable viral load meant the virus was not transmissible.13  
II. The Position of the Parties  
 The Crown took the position that nondisclosure should be criminalized regardless 
of whether the accused used a condom because of the “unreliability” of condoms. It 
argued that the fact that condoms had broken on three or four occasions with one 
complainant demonstrated that the accused was not using condoms properly. Further, 
the Crown pointed to the fact that there was no evidence that the virus could not be 
transmitted when a person’s viral load was undetectable. Even though that risk was 
very low, the potential consequences of transmission were so “lethal” that even a 
minimal risk was not one that a complainant should be expected to bear.14 
 The defence, in contrast, argued that protected sex should not be criminalized. 
Further, it was argued that it was highly probable that the accused could not have 
transmitted the virus when his viral count was low or undetectable. Defence counsel 
 
12 Ibid. at para. 72. 
13 The trial judge cited a 2008 statement authored by the Swiss Federal commission for HIV/AIDS, 
which states that a person who has an undetectable viral load is not sexually infectious if that person 
adheres to antiretroviral therapy, the viral load has been suppressed for at least six months and the 
person has no other sexually transmitted diseases: Pietro Vernazza et al., “Les personnes séropositives 
ne souffrant d’aucune autre MST et suivant un traitement antirétroviral efficace ne transmettent pas le 
VIH par voie sexuelle” (2008) 89 Bulletin des médecins suisses 165, online: SÄZ/BMS 
<http://www.saez.ch/pdf_f/2008/2008-05/2008-05-089.PDF>. The trial judge also cited a 
WHO/UNAIDS statement indicating that more research is needed to determine whether an 
undetectable viral load eliminates the risk of transmission: WHO/UNAIDS, Statement, “Antiretroviral 
therapy and sexual transmission of HIV” (1 February 2008), online: UNAIDS 
<http://data.unaids.org/pub/PressStatement/2008/080201_hivtransmission_en.pdf>.  
14 Mabior, supra note 8 at paras. 74-75. 
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claimed that the accused knew that his viral load was low and that he knew there was 
little or no risk of transmission. The accused relied on the fact that none of the 
complainants had been infected to support his argument that there was a very high 
probability that he could not have transmitted HIV during the relevant time period.15  
III. The Judgment 
 Justice McKelvey began her analysis by considering whether the Crown could 
establish that the accused had endangered the life of the complainant, a required 
element of the charge of aggravated assault. She found that this endangerment was 
established regardless of whether the accused used a condom. The finding of 
endangerment was based on the 20 per cent failure rate of condoms cited by the one 
expert witness at trial. In instances where the condom may have broken or fallen off, 
the trial judge found that this was the equivalent of no condom being used. The 
finding of endangerment was not negated during the period in which the accused had 
an undetectable viral load. The trial judge held that, although the risk was greatly 
reduced, the scientific evidence before her supported the position that HIV could still 
be transmitted when the accused’s viral load was undetectable, particularly if he or 
she had another sexually transmitted disease.16 
 In rejecting the relevance of viral load, Justice McKelvey stated that she was 
“prepared to follow the Supreme Court [in Cuerrier] in holding that the potentially 
lethal consequences of unprotected sexual contact leave room for no other conclusion 
than that endangerment of life has been substantiated.”17 Justice McKelvey then 
considered whether Mabior’s conduct constituted fraud vitiating the consent of the 
complainants—an inquiry that might be seen as logically prior to the determination of 
endangerment. She referred to the elements of fraud from Cuerrier: deception and an 
attendant deprivation to the complainants. Justice McKelvey easily found the element 
of deception in the accused’s failure to disclose his HIV-positive status. The issue of 
deprivation focused on whether there was a significant risk of serious bodily harm to 
the complainants.  
 In the context of unprotected sex, this finding was straightforward and the trial 
judge found that nondisclosure constituted fraud negating consent to sexual activity. 
The analysis was more complex, however, in the context of protected sex. Given the 
expert evidence before her that condoms fail in 20 per cent of cases, the judge held 
that even in those circumstances where protection was used, a significant risk of 
serious bodily harm existed if medical evidence indicated that the accused was 
infectious.18 However, where the accused’s viral load was very low or undetectable 
 
15 Ibid. at paras. 87-89. 
16 Ibid. at para. 105. 
17 Ibid. at para. 100. 
18 Ibid. at para. 116. 
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and the accused used a condom, these two factors together could reduce the risk of 
serious bodily harm such that there was no fraud vitiating consent: 
With respect to the condom there can, of course, be failure, breakage or 
improper utilization. That being said, there was “a lower risk” when protection 
was utilized according to medical and scientific evidence. I am persuaded that 
the combination of an undetectable viral load and the use of a condom would 
serve to reduce the risk below what would be considered a significant risk of 
serious bodily harm.19 
Thus, somewhat puzzlingly, the trial judge found that a low viral load in the context 
of protected sex could endanger the life of the complainant but that it could not create 
a significant risk of serious bodily harm for the purposes of fraud. Implicit in the 
judgment is the finding that the threshold for endangerment of life is lower than the 
significant risk of serious bodily harm required to negate fraud. 
IV. Analysis 
 As mentioned above, there are two novel and important findings in Mabior that 
warrant discussion. First, the trial judge found that an accused who does not disclose 
his or her HIV-positive status to sexual partners can be convicted of aggravated 
sexual assault even when a condom is used. Second, she held that when an accused 
uses a condom and has an undetectable viral load, the risk of serious bodily harm is 
reduced to a point where it is no longer significant enough to constitute fraud. Both of 
these issues force one to confront the reasoning in Cuerrier. In broader policy terms, 
these findings raise difficult questions about the appropriate scope and purposes of 
criminal law and its relationship to our evolving scientific understanding of 
HIV/AIDS. 
 There is a range of approaches that could be taken to the criminalization of 
nondisclosure of HIV status. The courts could focus on the harm caused, imposing 
criminal liability only when the virus has actually been transmitted.20 This approach is 
consistent with the criminal law’s focus on behaviour which causes harm to others. 
Alternatively, the courts could focus on the risk-taking behaviour of the accused and 
his or her moral blameworthiness, regardless of whether or not the virus was actually 
transmitted.21 In Cuerrier, the Supreme Court of Canada took the latter approach and 
 
19 Ibid. at para. 117 [emphasis added]. 
20 In the United States, only Utah takes this position. The wilful or knowing introduction of “any 
communicable or infectious disease” into a community is the general offence. Utah Code Ann. § 26-6- 
(West 2008). It is upgraded to a felony when it involves HIV along with prostitution or sexual 
solicitation (ibid., § 76-10-1309). See also Andrew M. Francis & Hugo M. Mialon, “The Optimal 
Penalty for Sexually Transmitting HIV”, online: (2008) 10 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 388 
<http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/10/2/388 > at 396.  
21 This is the approach taken in almost all American states with HIV-specific legislation. In their 
economic analysis, Francis and Mialon argue, in contrast, that the optimal outcome would involve 
criminalizing only the transmission of the virus, not behaviour that risks transmission: “We find that 
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did not require transmission as an element of the offence of aggravated assault. In 
fact, neither of the complainants in Cuerrier tested HIV-positive by the time of trial. 
Rather, the concept of fraud was based on the degree of risk created by the accused’s 
conduct.22  
 The majority in Cuerrier was particularly concerned that fraud not be defined so 
broadly that any risk of harm (such as the emotional harm that may result from 
deceptive sexual practices), could negate consent to sexual activity and give rise to 
assault charges. They held that the deception must pose a significant risk of serious 
bodily harm in order to negate consent.23 The Court conceptualized the duty to 
disclose in direct proportion to “the risks attendant upon the act of intercourse”: the 
greater the risk to the complainant, the more likely it is that the accused has a duty to 
disclose.24 In light of the Court’s focus on risk, the critical question arising out of the 
facts of Mabior is how condoms and viral load tie into the analysis of significant risk. 
A. The Use of Condoms 
 There are two components to the risk analysis in the determination of fraud. The 
first relates to the qualitative nature of the harm at issue—Cuerrier requires serious 
bodily harm. The second inquiry relates to the magnitude of the risk, that is, the 
likelihood that the harm will ensue—Cuerrier requires a significant risk. With respect 
to the first component, it is important to note that the risk encompassed by HIV 
transmission has changed since Cuerrier. The fact that HIV/AIDS is no longer 
necessarily fatal could change the risk calculation.25 However, given the nature of 
HIV and its potential to cause AIDS, it is likely that the risk of transmitting HIV will 
be seen as a risk of serious bodily harm as long as no cure exists. 
 The second inquiry is more complex: what degree of risk of HIV transmission is 
significant enough to justify criminal responsibility? Arguably, because the potential 
harm is so serious, any risk of transmission should suffice. But this is not what the 
majority held in Cuerrier. The majority suggested, without explicitly deciding, that if 
an HIV-positive accused used a condom, the risk of harm might not be significant 
                                                                                                                                       
the mechanism that sustains the optimal outcome involves a single penalty for knowingly or 
unknowingly transmitting HIV and no penalty for exposing another individual to risk of infection 
without transmitting the virus” (ibid. at 391). None of the US statutes criminalize persons who do not 
know they are HIV-positive (ibid. at 394-96).  
22 Cuerrier, supra note 4 at para. 95, Cory J. 
23 Ibid. at paras. 131-34, Cory J. McLachlin J. expressed the same concern in her reasons (ibid. at 
paras. 47-48). This finding has received much criticism. See e.g. John Flaherty, “Clarifying the Duty 
to Warn in HIV Transference Cases” (2008) 54 Crim. L.Q. 60 at 65 (arguing that the Cuerrier 
standard effectively imputes consent for “risky” sex so long as it is not too risky). 
24 Cuerrier, supra note 4 at para. 127. 
25 See Samantha Ryan, “Risk-Taking, Recklessness and HIV Transmission: Accommodating the 
Reality of Sexual Transmission of HIV within a Justifiable Approach to Criminal Liability” (2007) 28 
Liverpool L.R. 215 at 226-27 [Ryan, “Risk-Taking”].  
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enough to warrant criminal liability and thus that there might not be a requirement to 
disclose one’s HIV-positive status: 
To have intercourse with a person who is HIV-positive will always present 
risks. Absolutely safe sex may be impossible. Yet the careful use of condoms 
might be found to so reduce the risk of harm that it could no longer be 
considered significant so that there might not be either deprivation or a risk of 
deprivation.26  
The concurring minority judgment of Justice McLachlin (as she then was) explicitly 
held that the use of a condom would negate fraud.  
 There are only a few lower court decisions that consider the issue of condom use, 
probably because charges are more likely to be laid in cases involving unprotected 
sex. In R. v. Edwards, the trial judge proceeded on the assumption that only 
unprotected sex could be subject to criminal liability.27 Because he had a reasonable 
doubt as to whether the accused had used a condom, the trial judge did not find fraud 
negating consent. With respect to whether nondisclosure in the context of protected 
sex is criminal, the court in Edwards held that this issue should be left to Parliament.28 
Similarly, in R. v. Angnatuk-Mercier, the trial judge held that in order to convict the 
accused, “it must be established by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt that 
unprotected sex with him took place.”29  
 Clearly, the trial judge in Mabior did not follow these cases. Her conclusion that 
nondisclosure negates consent in the context of protected sex is a first in Canadian 
criminal law. The trial judge relied on expert testimony that condoms have a failure 
rate of up to 20 per cent without really explaining what this figure means. Does it, for 
example, include breakage and improper use of condoms or does it refer to condoms 
not providing 100 per cent protection even when used correctly?  
 It is important to note that a 20 per cent failure rate of condoms does not equate 
with a 20 per cent chance of acquiring HIV from an act of sexual intercourse. In fact, 
the rate of transmission of HIV is lower than is generally assumed. Although different 
studies cite different numbers, it is estimated, for example, that in one act of 
unprotected vaginal intercourse where the male is infected with HIV, the risk that the 
female partner will acquire HIV may be as low as 1 in 1000. The risk in anal 
intercourse is approximately 1 in 50 for the receptive partner. When used correctly, 
condoms reduce the rate of transmission by up to 90 per cent, such that the risk to the 
 
26 Cuerrier, supra note 4 at para. 129.  
27 R. v. Edwards, 2001 NSSC 80, 194 N.S.R. (2d) 107, 50 W.C.B. (2d) 255 [Edwards]. Note that 
Edwards is one of the few cases involving criminal charges in the context of a same-sex relationship. 
See Grant, supra note 1. 
28 “If the failure to disclose a contagious disease before engaging in ‘protected’ sex is to be a 
criminal offence, it is for the Legislature to so define such activity” (ibid. at para. 25).  
29 [2001] O.J. No. 4729 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Just.) (QL) at para. 7. 
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receptive partner in anal intercourse drops to 1 in 500 instead of 1 in 50.30 The 
Canadian AIDS Society considers unprotected anal and vaginal sexual intercourse to 
be “high risk behaviour[s]” in terms of the likelihood of the transmission of HIV, 
whereas it considers protected sex to be “low risk”.31 The risk of transmission is 
further decreased where antiretroviral medications have succeeded in reducing the 
individual’s viral load to an undetectable level.32 Thus, while a 20 per cent failure rate 
for condoms sounds high, the trial judge failed to examine what this figure means in 
terms of a risk of transmission of HIV: the key issue in determining whether fraud has 
been established. A 20 per cent failure rate of condoms does not quantify the risk of 
HIV transmission necessary to assess the significance of the risk.33  
 There are arguments for and against finding that the use of a condom negates any 
potential fraud. On the one hand, as discussed above, condoms do have a risk of 
failure. Condoms can fall off, break, or be used improperly. Proper use of condoms 
may also be more difficult where the parties are intoxicated, as they were in many of 
the sexual encounters at issue in Mabior. The question then becomes who should bear 
the risk of the condom not functioning properly, particularly if the virus is 
transmitted. Should the law require the infected partner to disclose his or her HIV-
positive status even when using a condom so that the uninfected partner, the person at 
greatest risk, can decide whether he or she wants to bear the risk of the condom 
failing? Requiring disclosure even in instances of protected sex expands the scope of 
criminal liability for failure to disclose and prioritizes the autonomy of the 
complainant to choose what risks she or he is prepared to accept in the context of 
sexual activity.34  
 On the other hand, it is indisputable that, short of abstinence, the use of a condom 
is the best known way to prevent the transmission of HIV. Condom use is at the 
centre of public health efforts to stem the transmission of HIV.35 Thus it is certainly 
arguable, as a matter of public policy, that the law should encourage individuals who 
may be HIV-positive to use condoms (and encourage others to insist on the use of 
condoms) with all of their sexual partners. Where possible, this argument goes, 
criminal law should be consistent with broad public health interests. Even the expert 
 
30 Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. Pinkerton, “Toward Rational Criminal HIV Exposure Laws” 
(2004) 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 327 at 328. See also Grant, supra note 1 at 128. 
31 See HIV Transmission: Guidelines for Assessing Risk, 5th ed., (Ottawa: Canadian AIDS Society, 
2004) at 24-25, online: Canadian AIDS Society <http://www.cdnaids.ca/web/repguide.nsf/pages/cas-
rep-0307>.  
32 WHO/UNAIDS, supra note 13. 
33 Of course, for any one person such statistics are meaningless. A complainant will either acquire 
HIV or not. 
34 See Flaherty, supra note 23 at 74, who argues that there must be a duty to warn whenever bodily 
harm is objectively foreseeable. 
35 See e.g. “It’s Your Health—HIV/AIDS” online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-
vs/iyh-vsv/diseases-maladies/hiv-vih-eng.php>. 
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witness at trial disagreed with the trial judge’s criminalization of protected sex. The 
trial judge cited the expert evidence as follows: 
There is no scientific justification to require HIV status disclosure if a condom 
is always used. There is a mutual responsibility for casual sex partners to be 
aware of the innate risks of non-monogamy and to ensure their own safety by 
adhering to consistent and correct condom use.36 
 Those who argue most forcefully against criminalization posit that it obscures the 
fact that both partners involved in a sexual encounter are responsible for taking 
precautions to prevent the transmission of disease.37 Criminalization puts the burden 
entirely on the infected partner and masks the responsibility of uninfected partners to 
insist on condom use. In response to this argument, the Supreme Court of Canada 
explicitly held in Cuerrier that the infected partner has a much greater responsibility 
than the uninfected partner to prevent transmission.38 
 Studies suggest that up to 40 per cent of individuals who have tested HIV-
positive do not disclose their status to any of their sexual partners.39 One study found 
that 52 per cent of sexually active, HIV-positive men did not disclose their status to 
one or more sexual partners. Of these, a significant number engaged in unprotected 
sex, particularly with casual partners.40 However, the incidence of nondisclosure must 
be seen in light of the fact that as many as two-thirds of all HIV transmissions occur 
before the infected individual knows that he or she is infected.41 This fact has 
implications for the utility of criminal law in preventing transmission and also points 
to the importance of consistent condom use. 
 Some studies suggest that the use of condoms is decreasing as a result of the 
optimism over new treatment avenues for HIV/AIDS.42 As indicated above, however, 
the use of condoms is crucially important if we are to curb the transmission of HIV. 
 
36 Evidence, Dr. Smith’s medical report and review of the accused’s medical and public health 
records at 12, cited in Mabior, supra note 8 at para. 72. 
37 Matthew Weait, “Taking the Blame: Criminal Law, Social Responsibility and the Sexual 
Transmission of HIV” (2001) 23 J. Soc. Welfare & Fam. L. 441 at 450-51. 
38 Cuerrier, supra note 4 at para. 144. 
39 Mike Allen et al., “Persons Living with HIV: Disclosure to Sexual Partners” (2008) 25 
Communication Reports 192 (compiling data from fifty-one studies on HIV disclosure from the past 
twenty years). For an overview of some of these studies, see also Julianne M. Serovich & Katie E. 
Mosack “Reasons for HIV Disclosure and Nondisclosure to Casual Sexual Partners” (2003) 15 AIDS 
Education & Prevention 70. 
40 Gary Marks, Jean L. Richardson & Norma Maldonado, “Self-disclosure of HIV Infection to 
Sexual Partners” (1991) 81 American Journal of Public Health 1321. 
41 See Burris et al., “Criminal Laws and Behavior”, supra note 6 at 476-77; James S. Koopman et 
al., “The Role of Early HIV Infection in the Spread of HIV Through Populations” (1997) 14 Journal 
of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes & Human Retrovirology 249. 
42 See e.g. Gary Marks, Scott Burris & Thomas A. Peterman, “Reducing sexual transmission of HIV 
from those who know they are infected: the need for personal and collective responsibility” (1999) 13 
AIDS 297. 
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While everyone should disclose his or her HIV status to potential sexual partners, the 
criminal law should be reserved for the most egregious cases of nondisclosure in the 
context of unprotected sex. Those who use condoms are making efforts to avoid 
transmission of the virus. If the courts send the message that nondisclosure is criminal 
regardless of the precautions taken, this could decrease the incentive to use condoms. 
I recognize that this view interferes with the right of individuals to make their own 
choices about the degree of risk they are willing to accept in sexual activity. There 
may be a small number of potential complainants who acquire the virus and yet do 
not have access to the criminal justice system under this model because a condom 
was used. Having said this, however, criminal prosecution after the fact does little to 
undo any harm caused by the failure to disclose. The state’s most coercive power 
should be limited to the most blameworthy cases.43  
 Modifying sexual behaviour requires a multifaceted approach; criminalization is 
not, on its own, sufficient. A recent American study, for example, found that persons 
at high risk for HIV (both those who had been tested and those who had not) did not 
alter their sexual practices (i.e., disclosure and the use of condoms) based on whether 
they believed the law required disclosure or condom use, thus casting doubt on the 
broad deterrent value of criminalization.44 Criminalizing nondisclosure regardless of 
protection will not protect society from persons such as Cuerrier45 or Mabior, until 
after they have engaged in sexual intercourse and put potential complainants at risk. 
But the law serves a symbolic function as well as a deterrent function. Even where 
deterrence is difficult to prove, it is important that the law send messages that are 
consistent with well-accepted public health policy. The non-criminalization of 
protected sex, at the very least, does not discourage condom use.  
B. Viral Load 
 With the development of new antiretroviral medications, it is now possible to 
reduce the presence of HIV in a person’s system to the point where it can no longer 
 
43 Most of the HIV-specific criminal offences in the US do not distinguish between protected and 
unprotected sexual activity. California, however, criminalizes only unprotected sex and only where 
there is an intent to transmit the virus. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120291 (West 2007). I note 
that the use of a condom will not necessarily rule out the possibility of tort liability for the individual 
who did not disclose his HIV status. See generally ter Neuzen v. Korn, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674, 127 
D.L.R. (4th) 577 [ter Neuzen], in which a woman who contracted HIV in the process of artificial 
insemination sued her doctor for negligence.  
44 Burris et al., “Criminal Laws and Behavior”, supra note 6 at 476. The authors do note, however, 
that this aggregate finding does not rule out the possibility that the criminal law does serve as a 
deterrent in individual cases. The authors suggest that “the role for criminal law in controlling sexual 
risk behavior is the same role one might reasonably assign to a politician visiting a battlefront: shut up 
and stay out of the way” (ibid. at 473). 
45 Cuerrier specifically rejected advice to disclose his status on the basis that he would never have a 
sex life if he did so (supra note 4 at para. 78). 
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be detected by our current testing standards.46 This does not mean that the virus is no 
longer present in the person’s immune system. Somewhat contradictory evidence was 
presented in Mabior as to the potential of infecting one’s partner when one’s viral 
load is undetectable. However, the preponderance of the evidence indicated that while 
an undetectable viral load decreases the likelihood of transmission significantly, it 
probably does not reduce it to zero, particularly if the accused has other sexually 
transmitted diseases.47 Thus, this issue also raises questions about the threshold of 
risk. On the one hand, if one accepts that the use of a condom reduces risk such that 
criminal liability should not attach, why would the same rationale not apply to an 
undetectable viral load? Both factors significantly reduce the risk of HIV 
transmission. At what point does the risk of transmission become so low that it is no 
longer considered significant? The Supreme Court of Canada did not address this 
issue because, at the time of Cuerrier, we did not have the capacity to reduce a 
person’s viral load so significantly.48  
 The trial judge clearly acknowledged that there is a point at which the risk of HIV 
transmission is insufficient to meet the definition of fraud. She decided that this point 
is reached where the accused used a condom and he or she had an undetectable viral 
load at the time of the sexual contact. One can understand this reasoning; these two 
factors cumulatively produce a substantial reduction in the risk of transmission. 
However, the viral load issue is complicated given our current scientific 
understanding. We cannot yet establish the precise risk of transmission for someone 
with an undetectable viral load. One’s viral load paints a snapshot in time and does 
not rule out transmissibility altogether. How close in time to the act of intercourse 
would the finding of an undetectable load have to be to negate fraud? How often 
would one have to be tested in order to establish a pattern of undetectability? It is also 
important to note that we may develop new technologies to detect the virus at levels 
which are currently undetectable. Thus what is undetectable today may not be so in 
the future.49  
 
46 “Undetectable Viral Load” online: Aidsmap <http://www.aidsmap.com/en/docs/C5FFB1B6-
A9F0-4D94-BF69-B338884099A2.asp>.  
47 Mabior, supra note 8 at para. 72. See also Marks, Burris & Peterman, supra note 42 at 297; 
Pamina M. Gorbach et al., “Don’t ask, don’t tell: patterns of HIV disclosure among HIV positive men 
who have sex with men with recent STI practising high risk behaviour in Los Angeles and Seattle” 
(2004) 80 Sexually Transmitted Infections 512 at 513. 
48 This example also demonstrates the difficulty in relying on judicial precedents which were 
decided at a time when our scientific knowledge about HIV/AIDS was very different than it is at 
present. 
49 This may have particular relevance to negligence actions against someone responsible for 
transmitting HIV. In ter Neuzen, for example, the Court acknowledged that the defendant doctor could 
not reasonably have foreseen the possibility of infection from an artificial insemination procedure 
based on the scientific knowledge at the time of his actions (supra note 43). If our scientific 
knowledge evolves to a point where it becomes medically possible to declare that an HIV-positive 
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 If we accept the legal relevance of viral load, difficult questions arise regarding 
the burden of proof. Would an undetectable viral load constitute a defence such that 
the accused would have the burden of proving that his or her viral load was 
undetectable at the relevant time? The alternative would be to assign the Crown the 
burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s viral load was 
not undetectable at the time of the sexual activity in question. This burden of proof 
would be virtually impossible to meet, particularly where there were multiple acts of 
intercourse or where repeated test results were not available. Liability could then turn 
on whether and when the accused was tested and on the availability of those test 
results.50 In addition, advances in scientific knowledge would likely impact several 
areas of HIV transmission prosecutions. For example, if we learn that the virus is not 
transmissible below a certain level, would proof of that viral level negate fraud and 
obviate the duty to disclose? If so, then surely the Crown would have to prove that 
the accused’s viral load was not at this level in order to obtain a conviction. In the 
only other case in which I was able to find a reference to viral load, the trial judge 
rejected its relevance, stating: “[I]t seems to be a fragile defence. All it reveals is the 
state of the blood tested on the day in question, not two weeks earlier, not two weeks 
later. … To rely on slips of paper from a lab seems fraught with hazard.”51  
 In addition to these practical obstacles to using viral load as a measure of risk in 
HIV nondisclosure cases, there are also significant policy concerns surrounding the 
use of viral load. Considering viral load in liability may open the door to HIV-
positive individuals making their own risk-assessments about transmissibility and 
disclosure. For example, some literature suggests that men are less likely to disclose 
their HIV-positive status when they have a low or undetectable viral load.52 The 
following quote reveals the dilemma: 
Lowering viral load and keeping it low may reduce the likelihood that a 
seropositive person may infect a partner during sexual contact. However, as 
treatment options enable people with HIV infection to live longer and feel 
healthier, those people may become more sexually active. Those who believe 
that that low viral load renders them non-infectious may stop using condoms. ... 
                                                                                                                                       
individual cannot transmit the virus with a particular viral load, transmission would likely not be 
reasonably foreseeable. 
50 The accused’s viral load was used as evidence in the recent case of Charles Mzite in British 
Columbia. The main issue at trial was whether the accused knew he was HIV-positive when he had 
unprotected sexual relationships with the four complainants. An expert testified that, given the 
accused’s viral load and low CD4 cell count, the accused must have had HIV for at least five to seven 
years. This in turn was relevant to whether the accused knew of his status. See R. v. Mzite (2 March 
2009), Victoria 140259 (B.C.S.C.), Johnston J.; Louise Dickson, “Mzite’s path from Africa to jail” 
Victoria Times Colonist (3 March 2009), online: Times Colonist: <http://www.timescolonist.com/ 
Health/Mzite+path+from+Africa+jail/1347582/story.html>. 
51 See R. v. McKenzie, (9 March 2006), Windsor (Ont. Sup. Ct. Just.), Donohue J. See also Don 
Lajoie, “Judge Tosses HIV Assault Case” Windsor Star (10 March 2006) A3. 
52 Marks, Burris & Peterman, supra note 47. See also Gorbach et al., supra note 47 at 513. 
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Recent studies suggest that optimism about the new HIV therapies is associated 
with sexual risk-taking in MSM [men who have sex with men].53 
It is understandable that the trial judge wanted to limit the potentially sweeping scope 
of criminal liability she extended to those who use condoms. However her means of 
achieving this end, by combining the use of a condom and low viral load, is 
problematic.  
 There is a compelling public policy rationale for encouraging condom usage. In 
contrast, there is less justification for including viral load in the risk calculation. 
Doing so could encourage people to make their own assessments about their 
infectivity before deciding on disclosure, thus potentially increasing the risk of 
transmission. Just as it is important to encourage the use of condoms as a public 
health measure, it is equally important not to send the message that people can assess 
their own viral loads and determine their own risk of transmission. When this concern 
is added to the problems created by imperfect scientific information, there is, at 
present, even less justification to employ viral load in the equation. It is possible that, 
as our understanding and ability to measure viral load develop, it will become a more 
manageable standard. But we have not yet reached that point.  
 In my view, Justice McKelvey should have held that condom use negates fraud. 
Such a finding probably would not have changed the outcome in Mabior given the 
dubious evidence of occasional and unreliable condom use. If the trial judge had 
limited criminal liability to unprotected sex, it would not have been necessary for her 
to consider the relevance of viral load because she only did so in the context of 
protected sex. The trial judge agreed that, in the absence of condom usage, a low viral 
load could not negate fraud.  
Conclusion
 It is clear that Mabior is a particularly troubling case and one that understandably 
evoked outrage in the trial judge. An HIV-positive man preying on vulnerable teenage 
girls and refusing to disclose his HIV-positive status makes a compelling case for 
prosecution. As the judge stated in convicting the accused: 
The accused’s conduct was deplorable and despicable in all of the 
circumstances and must be condemned in the strongest possible terms. Those 
that are infected with HIV cannot inappropriately and indiscriminately engage 
in sexual relationships for their own pleasure without regard to the 
consequences to others.54  
However, particularly egregious cases do not necessarily provide the best context in 
which to set broad criminal law policy. The outrageous nature of the facts in Mabior 
should not be invoked to extend the reach of criminal law to all potential accused 
 
53 Marks, Burris & Peterman, ibid. at 300 [footnotes omitted]. 
54 Mabior, supra note 8 at paras. 162-63. 
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who do not disclose their status, including individuals who genuinely attempt to 
protect their sexual partners by using a condom. Disclosure is extremely important 
and may be possible in the large majority of cases. Nevertheless, there may be 
reasons, such as intimate violence, that make disclosure extremely difficult or even 
dangerous for an individual. The social context of disclosing one’s HIV status should 
not be ignored.55 Professor Ryan argues, for example, that where disclosure creates 
significant risks for the infected partner, the criminal law should view careful use of 
condoms as a substitute for disclosure.56 
 The vexing issues in this case demonstrate how unwieldy prosecutions for failure 
to disclose HIV can be. Tales of intoxication, condoms breaking and falling off, poor 
memory of whether a condom was used at all, and conflicting evidence about the 
transmissibility of the virus in someone who has an undetectable viral load all 
demonstrate the problems involved in such prosecutions.57 The Manitoba Court of 
Appeal will soon have to decide whether viral load is relevant to liability and, if so, 
who bears the burden of proof of establishing the accused’s viral load at the relevant 
time. Similarly, the court will need to address whether the use of a condom 
sufficiently reduces the risk of bodily harm to preclude criminal liability. The answers 
to each of these issues will determine which cases can be prosecuted in the future. 
One hopes that the Manitoba Court of Appeal will take the opportunity to provide 
some certainty in this challenging area of criminal law. 
 Mabior demonstrates the difficulties in quantifying risk in the face of incomplete 
scientific knowledge about the factors that contribute to the risk caused by the 
accused’s conduct. There are no easy answers to the issues raised in Mabior. To argue 
against the prosecution of those who fail to disclose their status in the context of 
protected sex is not to suggest that nondisclosure is ever morally justified. But the 
criminal law is not coextensive with morality. When one balances, on the one hand, 
the limited utility of criminal prosecution in the context of protected sex with, on the 
other hand, the importance of promoting the use of condoms, the balance should 
come down in favour of the latter.  
    
 
55 Ryan, “Risk-Taking”, supra note 25 at 239-42. Professor Ryan posits the possibility of a defence 
to liability for women who are unable to disclose their status because of their fear of violence and 
inability to negotiate condom usage.  
56 Ibid. at 239. 
57 Further problems arise if the complainant is HIV-positive; the complainant’s sexual history then is 
subject to scrutiny. See Grant, supra note 1. 
